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Article 17

THE FIRST NAFTA LABOR CASES: A NEW
INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS REGIME TAKES SHAPE
LANCE A. COMPA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) l
created a new forum for worker rights advocacy in the expanding global
economy. When this labor side accord to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) took effect January 1, 1994, trade unions in the
United States, which had strongly opposed NAFTA, wasted little time
putting it to the test. Two of them, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (IBT) and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America (UE), filed complaints with the United States National Administrative Office (NAO). Their submissions alleged labor rights violations against workers in the Mexican maquiladora region by two large
U.S.-based multinational companies.
The NAO is the new agency created by the United States Department
of Labor to review and report on public communications concerning
labor law matters under the NAFTA labor side agreement. 2 Each NAFTA
country established its own NAO to treat labor law matters in another
NAFTA country. As a national entity that takes up labor rights issues
outside the national territory, the NAO is a unique institution. It has
no counterpart under the NAFTA environmental side agreement, nor
under any other labor rights regime in Europe or elsewhere. As such,
the first controversies brought to it under the NAALC bear close examination, both for indications as to how future cases will be handled
as NAFTA and its side agreements evolve, and for comparison to other
forums where international labor rights advocacy is undertaken.
Prediction of future events and a full comparative study are beyond
the scope of this paper. The purpose here is to describe in some detail
the NAO's processing of the first NAFTA labor rights cases. However,
it is useful to first situate this new arena for labor rights advocacy in
the broader landscape of labor3 rights regimes, especially with respect to
their enforcement mechanisms.
The most established and best-known forum for labor rights treatment
is the International Labor Organization (ILO), a United Nations-related

* Attorney, and Director, International Labor Rights Advocates, Washington, D.C.
1. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
2. See Jorge F. P~rez-L6pez, The Institutional Framework of the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation, 3 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 133 (1995).

3. For a more thorough discussion of the variety of arenas where international labor rights
are treated, see Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25 J.L.
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165-91 (1993).

U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

body that fashions labor rights and labor standards adopted by government, business and labor delegates to its annual conference. 4 Since its
founding in 1919, over 175 conventions and a similar number of recommendations have been adopted by the ILO.5 The ILO has various procedures for handling complaints against member States, and different
standing or ad hoc committees to conduct inquiries and issue reports on
such complaints. 6 However, the ILO has no sanctioning power or other
means of enforcing its standards. It must rely on behind-the-scenes dimoral force to persuade
alogue, embarrassing publicity or other forms of
7
labor rights violators to change their conduct.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
is another multilateral forum where labor rights issues can be raised.
This coordinating body for the developed economies of Europe and North
America (including Mexico, which joined the OECD in 1993), along with
Japan, Australia and New Zealand, issued Guidelines for Multinational
Corporations in 1976.8 Under the Guidelines, complaints alleging labor
rights violations by multinational companies operating in member countries
can be brought before OECD committees that review application of the
guidelines.
As with the ILO, no form of sanction may ensue under the OECD
guidelines. Although trade unions complain of weakness in the guidelines,
several stubborn labor-management disputes have been resolved in the
course of OECD case processing.9 The key here, as with the ILO, lies
in the availability of an international forum for labor rights advocacy
that entails an obligation to answer complaints and explain labor relations
actions and policies. Even without potential sanctions at the end of the
day, this creates an accountability that might otherwise be lacking.
While they do not provide for sanctions in the hard sense (imprisonment,
fines or other financial penalties, or punitive trade measures such as
increased tariffs or import bans), labor rights directives of the European
Union' 0 and labor rights guarantees under European human rights

4. For a concise history of the ILO, see DYAVID A. MORSE, THE ORIGI AND EVOLUTION OF
THE ILO AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1969). For a more recent analysis of ILO
activities, see EcoNoMIc POLICY COUNCIL, UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NEW OPTIONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990s (1991).

5. See ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1991 (1992).
6. The ILO's complaint-handling mechanism is complex. For a description, see Lee Swepston,

Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International Labor Organizatibn, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTs PRACTICE 99-116 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992).
7. For a discussion of the ILO's "moral suasion" as a means of enforcement, see Virginia A.

Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 580 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
8. See OECD, DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

(rev. 1979).
9. For an account of labor dispute resolution under the OECD and ILO guidelines, see DUNCAN
RICHARD L. RowAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS GUIDELINES (1983) [hereinafter CAMPBELL & ROWAN].
10. See Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy, 31
C.

CAMPBELL &

I.L.M. 247, 357 (Feb. 7, 1992).
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instruments" have been treated by signatory countries as obligatory.12
Indeed, national laws have been changed-sometimes with great reluctance-after the European Court of Justice or the European Court of
Human Rights found a country in violation of labor rights norms. 3
Trade sanctions do exist in unilateral labor rights regimes established
by the United States under several of its trade laws. Labor rights amendments have been added to statutes governing the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) in 1984,14 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
in 1985, 5 the Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1986,16 Section 301 of the

Trade Act of 1988,17 and Agency for International Development (AID)
funding for economic development grants overseas. 18 In each case, a
suspension or elimination of benefits or beneficiary status conferred by
these programs can be applied against countries found to consistently
violate internationally recognized worker rights. 19
The GSP labor rights regime administered by the United States Trade

Representative (USTR) has the most detailed mechanism for handling
complaints, with some features similar to those of the U.S. NAO. It
includes an annual petitioning cycle, standards for accepting petitions for

11. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
12. For a description of European human rights regimes, see P. VAN Din & G.J.H. VAN HOOF,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1990).
13. See, e.g., European Community Cannot Ban Night Work for Women, Court Rules, 9
EMPLOYEE REL. WKLY. (BNA) 856 (Aug. 5, 1991) (requiring France to revise a prohibition on
women working night shifts); Robert Rice & David Goodhart, Britain Ruled in Breach of EU
Employment Laws, FIN. T~ms (London), June 9, 1994, at 1. For an extended treatment of European
labor standards, see ROGER BLANPAIN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF .THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1991).
14. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988). The GSP program permits a developing country to export
goods to the United States on a preferential, duty-free basis as long as they meet the conditions
for eligibility in the program.
15. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2191-2200 (1988). OPIC insures the overseas investments of U.S. corporations
against losses due to war, revolution, expropriation or other factors related to political turmoil, as
long as the country receiving the investment meets conditions for eligibility under OPIC insurance.
16. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988). A 1990 labor rights amendment to what is now called the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1159 (1989)
(current version at 19 U.S.C.A. §2702 (West Supp. 1994)), expanded the worker rights clause to
comport with GSP and OPIC formulations. CBERA grants duty-free status to exports into the
United States from Caribbean basin countries on a more extensive basis than under GSP provisions.
17. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2419 (1988). Section 301 defines various unfair trade practices, now
including worker rights violations, making a country that trades with the United States liable to
retaliatory action.
18. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2151-2376 (West Supp. IV 1992).
19. See Jorge Prez-L6pez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. Approach, 9
COMP. LAB. L.J. 253 (1988). For a criticism of the United States approach to international labor
rights as reflected in these statutes, see Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law:
"Aggressive Unilateralism"?,15 Hum. RTs. Q. 1 (1993); Theresa Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality:
United States Trade Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990);
Harlan Mandel, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: International Worker Rights and International
Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443 (1989). For a defense of such clauses, see JoHN CAVANAGH
ET AL., TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (1988); Terry
Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clarifying Policies and
Interests, 31 B.C. L. RV. 31 (1989).
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review, and a review process with public hearings and filings of written

briefs and responses.20 Several countries have been removed or suspended

from preferential trade treatment under the GSP program becafise of
labor rights violations. 2' Some have had GSP benefits restored after
reforming their labor laws or labor law enforcement to comport with
international standards .22
II.

A.

CREATING THE LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT
AND THE NAO

Background to the NAALC
The NAFTA labor and environmental side agreements had their genesis

in the 1992 presidential campaign of Bill Clinton. 23 Seeking to balance
the market-opening concerns of his economic advisors with the social
concerns of labor and environmental supporters, Clinton pledged to go
forward with NAFTA on the condition that parallel accords on labor
rights and environmental protection be negotiated with Mexico and Canada. 24 United States unions saw the labor side agreement as insufficient
to protect workers and continued their fierce opposition to NAFTA.2
For their part, environmental forces divided between those who viewed
that side agreement as acceptable and those who argued that it fell short
of necessary protective measures .26

20. See Regulations of the USTR Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and Countries for the
Generalized System of Preference Program, 15 C.F.R. §§ 2007.0 to 2007.8 (1994).
21. See International Trade-Assessment of the Generalized System of Preferences, USGAO Pub.
GAO/GGD-95-9, at 107-08 (Nov. 1994); Compa, supra note 3, at 182 n.91.
22. GSP labor rights case files are available for public inspection at the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C. For an inconclusive judicial review of the GSP labor
rights enforcement program, see Int'l Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund et al. v. Bush et al.,
954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (divided court sustained motion to dismiss on jurisdiction, standing
and justiciability grounds).
23. See Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor Cooperation Agreement Among Mexico, Canada and
the United States; Its Negotiation and Prospects, 3 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 121 (1995) [hereinafter Herzstein].
24. See Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, Address at Raleigh,
North Carolina (Oct. 4, 1992).
25. For accounts of labor's organizing effort against NAFTA, see Peter T. Kilborn, Unions
Girdfor War Over Trade Pact, N.Y. Tms, Oct. 4, 1993, at A14; Thomas K. Friedman, Adamant
Unions Zero In On Clinton, N.Y. Tumiss, Nov. 10, 1993, at B10. Labor advocates' criticism of the
labor side agreement focused on two important features: 1) the absence of common labor rights
and labor standards or any plan for gradual "harmonization" among NAFTA parties-instead, the
agreement obligates each party to effectively enforce its own labor laws; and 2) the dividing of
eleven defined "labor law matters" into different levels of treatment wherein three fundamental
rights, from labor's standpoint-the right of association, the right to organize and bargain, and
the right to strike-are subject only to review and consultation; eight remaining "technical labor
standards"-regarding forced labor, child labor, minimum wage and hour standards, employment
discrimination, equal pay for men and women, job health and safety, workers' compensation for
occupational injuries and illnesses and protection of migrant workers-are subject to evaluation and
recommendations by an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE); and of those eight only threechild labor, health and safety, and minimum wage and hour standards-can go forward to dispute
resolution and possible sanctions. See Herzstein, supra note 23.
26. For the most part, those environmental NGO's that depend on large corporate grants for
their primary funding sources supported NAFTA. Those with a grass roots base of individual donors
opposed it. See Keith Schneider, Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free-Trade Pact,
N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 16, 1993, at Al.
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This paper does not judge the validity of such criticisms of the NAFTA
side agreements. Like any negotiated instrument, they reflect compromise
among competing interests. When the negotiators speak for three sovereign
nations, each with their own swirling, often clashing business, labor,
environmental and political currents, the results are even more complex
and nuanced. The surer present course for making sound judgments about
the labor side agreement is to let experience under it take shape.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation has certain
hybrid characteristics. It stresses cooperation and consultation, as the title
suggests and as various articles repeat. An agenda of sixteen subject areas
is set forth for cooperative activities, with plans for conferences, research
projects, technical assistance and other methods of cooperation. 27 At the
same time, however, the Agreement contains a quasi-judicial contentious
procedure that can lead to fines or suspension of NAFTA trade benefits
for persistent violations of certain defined labor rights and labor standards. 28 Thus, cooperation and contention co-exist in the NAFTA labor
side agreement. It remains to be seen how this inherent tension will play
itself out in practice.
B.

The National Administrative Office
The NAO of each NAFTA party provides the first level of treatment
of labor rights issues under the labor side accord. A critical function of
each is to review labor law matters in one or both of the other NAFTA
parties-not domestic matters. In this sense, the thrust of the NAO's
function runs counter to the otherwise firm preservation of sovereignty
under the labor side accord. The Agreement recognizes "the right of
each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards" 29 and insists
that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to empower a Party's
authorities to undertake labor law enforcement activities in the territory
of another Party." 30 Nonetheless, empowering the authorities of a Party
to review "labor law matters arising in the territory of another Party""a
putatively breaches sovereignty in the strictest sense. It subjects domestic
law and administration to judgments, including critical judgments, by a
2
foreign entity.3
C. The U.S. NAO's Procedural Guidelines
United States employer and labor organizations first battled over the
procedural guidelines for NAO reviews. The labor side agreement permits
each country's NAO to conduct its reviews "in accordance with domestic

NAALC, supra note 1, art. 11.
Id. arts. 27-41.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 42.
Id. art. 16(3).
For a broader discussion of the sovereignty issue, see Lance Compa, Enforcing Worker
Rights Under the NAFTA Labor Side Accord, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 535 (1994).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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procedures." ' 33 Employer groups urged the U.S. NAO to establish guidelines for cooperative activities only, arguing that the very title of the
labor side accord-the "North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation"-precludes any form of review or other contentious procedures
except in the most unusual circumstances. Employers also asked the NAO
to forbid the naming of any individual corporation in communications
to the NAO, and to refuse to take up any matter until all domestic
avenues of recourse in administrative agencies or courts were exhausted.3 4
Predictably, labor rights advocates took an opposite tack. They called
on the NAO to accept all but demonstratively frivolous complaints for
review, and to hold field hearings in the United States city closest to
3
events giving rise to a complaint. The U.S. NAO struck a careful compromise in its final procedural
guidelines. 36 It stresses cooperation and consultation with other NAOs as
guiding principles in its work. 37 It does not refer to "complaints," but
rather "submissions," as the subject of filings by private parties under
the side agreement. 3 8 It sets a fairly low threshold for initiating a review, 39
but requires submitters to show that "appropriate relief" has been soughtnot exhausted-under the domestic laws of the other Party.n4 The guidelines also make the NAO review process an exclusive avenue of recourse
among international labor rights regimes, barring review if the matter
has been brought to the ILO, the OECD or another international body. 41
The U.S. NAO provides for "prompt" hearings on submissions in
most cases, 42 "as may be appropriate to assist the Office to better
understand and publicly report on the issues raised. ' 43 Under the procedural guidelines established by the NAO, within 120 days of the acceptance of a petition for review (subject to an extension of sixty additional
days) it "shall issue a public report, which shall include a summary of
the proceedings and any findings and recommendations." 44
At any point, under the terms of the Agreement, the NAO may request
consultations with the NAO of another Party in connection with labor
law, labor law administration or labor market conditions in the territory

33. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 16(3).
34. See Letter from U.S. Council for International Business to U.S. NAO, Comments on
Implementation of U.S. National Administrative Office (Feb. 15, 1994) (on file with U.S, NAO).
35. See Memorandum from International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund to U.S.
NAO, Comments and Suggestions on Procedural Guidelines (Feb. 15, 1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with U.S. NAO).
36. See Revised Notice of Establishment of United States National Administrative Office and
Procedural Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660-62 (1994) [hereinafter Procedural Guidelines].
37. Id. § D(I).
38. Id. § C(4).
39. It permits review unless "statements contained in the submission, even if substantiated, would
not constitute a failure of another Party to comply with its obligations ....
Id. § G(3)(b).
40. Id. § G(3)(c).
41. Id.
42. Id. § H(3).
43. Id. § H(l).

44. Id. § H(8).

Symposium 19951

FIRST NAFTA LABOR CASES

of that Party. 4 Following Article 21 consultations between NAOs, the

U.S. NAO may also recommend that the Secretary of Labor request
Ministerial Consultations under Article 22, which permits such consultations on "any matter within the scope of this Agreement,"

46

or rec-

ommend that the Secretary of Labor request that an Evaluation Committee
of Experts be established under Article 23 on one or more47of the eight
"technical labor standards" susceptible to ECE treatment.
III.
A.

THE IBT AND UE SUBMISSIONS TO THE U.S. NAO

The Submissions
On February 14, 1994, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters

(IBT) and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
(UE) filed the first submissions to the U.S. National Administrative Office

under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. 48 The cases

are similar in their timing and in their allegations, and were processed
jointly by the U.S. NAO.
Both labor submissions alleged dismissals of groups of employees in
late 1993 because of their attempts to form a union affiliated with the
Frente Autdntico del Trabajo (Authentic Labor Front, F.A.T.). The
F.A.T. is a Mexican labor grouping not tied to the dominant Confederaci6n de Trabajadoresde Mdxico (Mexican Labor Federation, C.T.M.),
an arm of the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party. The IBT

submission concerned events at a Honeywell factory in Chihuahua; the
UE submission involved events at a General Electric plant in Ciudad

Judrez. 49 Both submissions were accompanied by sworn affidavits from
Mexican workers alleging that they were discharged for union activity.

45. NAALC, supra note I, art. 21.
46. Id. art. 22.
47. Id. art. 23. See supra text accompanying note 25 for the eight "technical labor standards."
48. Styled as "complaints" by the submitting labor organizations, the Teamsters' submission is
Case No. 940001 (on file with U.S. NAO) [hereinafter IBT submission] and the Electrical Workers'
submission is Case No. 940002 (on file with U.S. NAO) (hereinafter UE submission] (The IBT
represents thousands of Honeywell employees, and the UE thousands of General Electric employees
in various locations in the United States; both unions were active in the legislative campaign to
defeat NAFTA.).
49. In February 1992, the UE and the F.A.T. announced a "Strategic Organizing Alliance"
with a declared purpose of "exploring practical new forms of international labor solidarity in the
struggle to improve living and working conditions on both sides of the border." The UE-F.A.T.
Strategic Organizing Alliance: Statement of Joint Work,
1 (Feb. 1992) (on file with U.S. NAO).
The UE-F.A.T. Alliance targets the factories of UE-represented companies in the United States that
have relocated all or parts of their operations in the Mexican maquiladora.Among these are factories
making electric motors, wire harnesses, printed circuit boards and other electrical and electronic
equipment. The UE-F.A.T. Strategic Organizing Alliance also contained a commitment to "continue
joint action strategies to fight against the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement and to
fight for a new Continental Development Agreement that benefits the people of the United States,
Canada and Mexico, not just the corporations." Id. 1 6.
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Such anti-union discrimination is unlawful under the Mexican Constitution, the Mexican Federal Labor Law, and ILO Convention 87, ratified
by Mexico and thus part of its law.5 0
In written communications to the U.S. NAO, Honeywell and General
Electric denied that any dismissals were related to union activity. Instead,
they insisted that termination of the employees was due to an economic
reduction in force or, in some cases, due to employee misconduct. 5 ' The
positions of the submitting unions and the companies are diametrically
opposed, and there is no intention in this paper to assess the truth of
the allegations. Experienced labor attorneys know well that cases alleging
discriminatory discharge are often the most difficult for counsel to litigate
and for triers of fact to decide, with complex rules governing shifting
burdens of proof in "dual motive" cases and "pretext" cases.5 2
The IBT and UE submissions also contained allegations about health
and safety hazards and overtime pay violations as issues that prompted
worker efforts to organize. These are subjects that technically are susceptible to every level of treatment under the labor side agreement,
including sanctions . 3 However, they were raised by submitters more on
the margins than in the center of their cases, and did not figure prominently in further processing of the case. Instead, the NAO's treatment
of the cases focused on the alleged discriminatory discharges in relation
to the right of association and protection of the right to organize, which
are subject only to first-level review and consultation treatment but cannot
proceed to second-level evaluation or third-level dispute resolution.
B.

Granting Review
The U.S. NAO accepted the IBT and UE submissions for review on
April 15, 1994. 54 The United States Council for International Business
and the General Electric Company raised several procedural objections
to this decision:
1) that the dismissals at issue took place in 1993, before the effective
date of the side agreement;
2) that the submissions did not allege a "pattern of practice" of
violations under the Agreement;

50. See CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONST. - POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES], art. 123 (10th ed. Delma Edition) (Mex.); Ley Federal
del Trabajo [Federal Labor Law], DIARIO OFIcIAL DE LA FEDERACI6N [OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF THE
FEDERATION-hereinafter D.O.] art. 133, at 356-58 (Apr. 1, 1970) (Mex.); Convention Concerning
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (ILO Convention No. 87) (entered
into force July 4, 1950), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at
435.
51. See Letter from Honeywell and attached Comments on NAb Submission #940001 (Aug. 31,
1994); Letter from General Electric and attached Submission #940002-Position Statement of the
General Electric Company (Aug. 17, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
52. See, e.g., N.R.L.B. v. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enf'd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
53. See supra text accompanying note 25.
54. Determination to Accept Submission #940001 for Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,832-33 (1994);
Determination to Accept Submission #940002 for Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,833-34 (1994).
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3) that the complaining unions or affected workers had not invoked
(per General Electric) or exhausted (per C.I.B.) domestic remedies in
Mexico;
4) that the submissions focused on alleged wrongdoing by individual
companies rather than on a failure by Mexico to effectively enforce its
labor laws. 5
A careful reading of the NAALC and the NAO's procedural guidelines
supports the NAO's action. The Agreement defines "pattern of practice"
as "a course of action or inaction beginning after the date of entry into
force of the Agreement, and does not include a single instance or case.''56
If the allegation of a "pattern of practice" were required for an NAO
review, such review would clearly be precluded under this definition.
However, the "pattern of practice" criterion, with its post-January 1,
1994 requirement, does not come into play under the labor side agreement's terms until an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) is formedafter the NAO has completed a review.5 7 In contrast, the NAALC provides
for a broad scope of NAO review, namely "labor law matters arising
in the territory of another Party, ' 58 with no other limiting criteria as to
timeliness or "pattern."
The employers simply erred in raising the domestic remedy objection.
First, most of the dismissed employees sought and received severance
pay in proceedings under the Mexican labor law system, and some of
them declined severance pay and did seek reinstatement under Mexican
law. Second, the NAO guidelines explicitly do not require exhaustion of
domestic remedies, but only that relief has been "sought" under domestic
laws.5 9
The issue of enforcement by Mexican authorities, distinct from alleged
unfair labor practices by individual employers, posed a thornier problem
for submitting unions and for the U.S. NAO. A core obligation assumed
6
by the Parties to the NAALC is to "effectively enforce its labor law."
The NAOs are not intended to operate as a surrogate National Labor
Relations Board, issuing complaints and conducting trials on charges of
unfair labor practices by respondent employers or labor organizations. 6 '
Although both unions' submissions raised issues of enforcement-mainly
arguing the futility of recourse to Mexican labor law administrators 2-

55. See Letter from the U.S. Council for International Business, (Aug. 31, 1994) (on file with
U.S. NAO); Letter from General Electric (Apr. 5, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO). For its part,
Honeywell did not interpose procedural objections. It filed a position paper that went to the merits
of the case, defending its actions at the Chihuahua factory that gave rise to the union submission.
See supra note 51.
56. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 49.
57. Id. art. 23.
58. Id. art. 16.

59. See Procedural Guidelines, supra note 36, § G(3)(c).
60. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
61. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, 3-6 (1988).
62. The UE submission alleges that the failure of the Mexican authorities to enforce its labor
laws is established by a number of sources, and goes on to describe the sources in some detail.
UE submission, supra note 48. The Teamster submission discusses the then-pending complaint of
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their content was closer in substance to an unfair labor practice complaint
against the employers.
In part, the unions' focus on alleged corporate wrongdoing was due
to inexperience with the NAO and the labor side agreement. In the United
States, union experience in invoking legal processes is largely one of filing
complaints against companies.63 It is only natural that here, with no
guidelines in place and no prior cases for guidance, the unions would
rely on formulations with which they are most comfortable. Besides that,
though, the unions did not want to let the employers "off the hook"
for what they saw as moves to crush union organizing. Perhaps, the
unions reasoned, companies might become more cautious in their treatment
of union activists if they realize that the labor side agreement creates a
forum where adverse publicity about working conditions in Mexico could
affect the United States corporate image.64
The unions' most solid ground for the viability of their submissions
lies in the labor side agreement itself. "Enforcement" is not the beginning
and end of obligations assumed by the Parties. The NAALC provides
that "each Party shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide
for high labor standards, ' 6 that "[e]ach Party shall promote compliance
with ... its labor law,' '66 and that "the Parties are committed to promote
... [flreedom of association and protection of the right to organize." 67
Each of these formulations goes beyond the enforcement issue per se.
The broad scope of NAO review, "labor law matters," does not restrict
review to enforcement issues. Likewise, the NAO's procedural guidelines
reflect this broad scope, permitting review of submissions "on labor law
matters arising in the territory of another Party,''68 without specifying
enforcement as the relevant "matter." Similarly, Ministerial Consultations
which would follow an NAO review are held "regarding any matter
within the scope of this Agreement.' '69 As with the "pattern of practice"
criterion, "enforcement" first appears as a mandatory criterion for action
under the NAALC in Article 23 establishing the scope of an ECE

one of the dismissed employees before the Mexican labor board, pointing out that such labor boards
have a reputation for refusing to reinstate workers when fired for supporting an independent union.
IBT submission, supra note 48. The submission goes on to request relief specifically aimed at
enforcement by Mexican authorities.
63. U.S. unions rarely use ILO or OECD procedures, compared to their European counterparts.
See CAMPBELL & RoWAN, supra note 9.
64. As one union official stated, "You [the NAO] have the ability to create [substantial] headaches
for corporations and government bodies that disregard labor rights, to focus the spotlight of public
attention and condemnation on their behavior, and to give pause to those who contemplate embarking
on that path." See Statement from Amy R. Newell to U.S. NAO, "Violations of Worker Rights
by General Electric Company and Failure of the Mexican Government to Effectively Enforce Laws
Protecting Labor Rights," at 3 (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
65. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 2.
66. Id. art. 3(1). See also id. art. 1(f).
67. Id. annex 1 (Labor Principles). In addition, Article I specifies that the objective of the
NAALC is to "promote, to the maximum extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex
I." Id. art. l(b).
68. Procedural Guidelines, supra note 36, § C(4).
69. NAALC, supra note I, art. 22.
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evaluation. 70 Enforcement as such does not appear to limit the scope of
an NAO review or subsequent consultations.
Had it chosen to adopt a narrow procedural approach to the unions'
submissions, the U.S. NAO might have sustained a stricter reading of
the labor side agreement and rejected review on timeliness and "pattern"
grounds, or over the "enforcement" question, notwithstanding the broader
language of the Agreement. However, it is impossible to divorce a technical
reading of a legal instrument from a "reading" of the political winds
in the wake of the bitter fight over NAFTA. United States unions had
been vociferous in their opposition to NAFTA and in their criticism of
the labor side agreement. Had the NAO rejected these submissions on
a technicality, new blasts of criticism from organized labor and its allies
in Congress, congressional hearings, perhaps even a union "boycott" of
the side accord, would likely have ensued-especially where, as here, a
careful, technical reading of the NAALC would not result in barring
review. In this instance, the NAO did not have to make an overtly
political decision to grant review in the face of contrary language in the
Agreement. The language itself justified acceptance and review of the
unions' submissions.
C. The Review Process and Planning the Public Hearing
Having accepted the submissions for review, the U.S. NAO undertook
"such further examination of the submission as may be appropriate to
assist the Office to better understand and publicly report on the issues
raised. ' 71 It continued a regular dialogue with the submitting unions and
with representatives of the corporations involved in the cases. It requested
and received information from the NAO of Mexico.7 2 It commissioned
two extensive studies of Mexican labor law and labor law administration,
especially as they relate to freedom of association and the right to
organize. 73 Finally, on July 28, 1994, the U.S. NAO announced that a
public hearing would be held August 31, 1994 in Washington, D.C. on
the submissions and invited "persons wishing to provide information or
present their views on matters related to the review" to file statements
74
or request to testify.

70. Id. art. 23(2).
71. Procedural Guidelines, supra note 36, § H(1).
72. In response to the U.S. NAO's request, the NAO of Mexico applied strictly the terms of
Article 21 of the labor side agreement on "Consultations between NAO's." It provided "descriptions
of its laws, regulations, procedures, policies or practices," but refused the NAO's request for
information on the specific allegations of the IBT and UE submissions. NAALC, supra note 1,
art. 21. See Letter from Oficina Administrativa Nacional de Mdxico to U.S. NAO, (July 5, 1994)
(on file with U.S. NAO).
73. See REPORT, LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MEXICO AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION BOARDS, NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN FREE

TRADE (July 26, 1994); PAUL A. CURTIS, REPORT, QUESTIONS ON LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
MEXICO AND THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION BOARDS (Sept. 7, 1994).

74. See Notice of Hearing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,492 (1994). Originally announced for August 31,
1994, the hearing was later postponed until September 12, 1994.
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The conditions announced by the NAO for the conduct of the hearing
engendered a new controversy with submitting unions. The NAO rejected
the unions' request that the hearing take place in El Paso, Texas, the
United States city closest to Ciudad Juirez and Chihuahua. It required
written statements or briefs ten days in advance of the hearing, limited
oral testimony to a ten-minute summary of the written statement, and
prohibited any sound or film recording devices at the hearing. 7"
Union representatives argued:
1) that travel expenses to Washington, D.C., as opposed to a field
hearing in El Paso, would deny many affected workers the opportunity
to testify at the hearing;
2) that requiring a full written statement ten days in advance of the
hearing was burdensome and unnecessary, especially for Mexican witnesses
in the midst of campaigns for their August 21, 1994 presidential election;
3) that ten minutes were insufficient for witnesses to complete their
testimony;
4) that the media prohibition would stifle public awareness of labor
rights under the NAALC; and
5) that union representatives should be allowed a greater role in the
hearing, including being able to question witnesses.7 6 Prompted by union
77
advocates, similar protests were registered by members of Congress.
The unions and their congressional allies may not have sufficiently
appreciated a waiver clause included by the NAO in its announcement
of the public hearing: "The requirements relating to the submission of
writterd statements or briefs and requests to present oral testimony may
be waived by the Secretary of the U.S. National Administrative Office
for reasons of equity and the public interest." ' 78 In the end, the U.S.
NAO struck a careful compromise. It adhered to the decision to conduct
the hearing in Washington, D.C., as a site "readily accessible to a broad
cross-section of interested parties." ' 79 It maintained the media limitation,
pointing out that the print media had complete access to the hearing
and that a complete transcript would become part of the public record.
It continued to limit union participation to presentation of testimony,
not cross examination, on the grounds that "no witness has the right
to cross examine any other witness because the hearing is informational
rather than adversarial." 80
Responding to union concerns, the NAO moved the hearing date back
two weeks to September 12, 1994, giving the unions and their witnesses
more time to prepare. It waived the requirement for complete written

75. See id. (Nature and Conduct of Hearing).
76. See Letter from United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) to U.S.
NAO (July 29, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
77. See Letter from Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (Aug. 3, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
78. Hearing on Submissions #940001 and #940002, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,493 (1994) (Written Statements
of Briefs and Requests to Present Oral Testimony).
79. Letter from NAO to Rep. Gephardt (Aug. 10, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
80. Id.
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statements ten days in advance of the hearing, accepting instead brief
descriptions of anticipated testimony. It accepted the unions' proposal
to have presentations by four panels of witnesses rather than individuals,
and agreed to blocks of time ranging from forty minutes to two hours
for the witness panels to make their presentations at the hearing. 8'
IV.

THE FIRST PUBLIC HEARING BY THE U.S. NAO

The U.S. NAO's hearing on the IBT and UE submissions under the
NAALC took place on September 12, 1994 in a large conference room
at the United States Department of Labor headquarters in Washington,
D.C. The only witnesses that appeared were trade union representatives.
Officials of Honeywell and General Electric did not testify at the hearing,
choosing instead to file written statements.8 2 The NAO of Mexico did
not participate in the hearing, as it could have under the procedural
guidelines of the U.S. NAO.8 3 No other persons requested to testify at
the hearing.
The Secretary of the U.S. NAO opened the hearing with a statement
of purpose and a review of the ground rules for the conduct of the
hearing.8 4 Panel 1 consisted of the President of the IBT and the General
Secretary-Treasurer of the UE. 85 They presented overviews of their experiences with Honeywell, General Electric, and other companies transferring production to Mexico, and of their efforts to develop mutual
organizing and bargaining projects with unions in Mexico. They repeated
core arguments of United States unions against what they viewed as the
pro-employer content of NAFTA, as well as the weaknesses of the labor
side agreement. 8 6 At the same time, the UE officer expressed belief that
"the NAO can make the difference, can elevate the question of respect
for workers' rights far beyond the level that your actual enforcement
power would lead one to expect." '8 7 These witnesses were not questioned
by the U.S. NAO.
Panel 2 consisted of one former employee from the Honeywell plant
in Chihuahua and one former employee from the General Electric plant
in Judrez, accompanied by a representative of the F.A.T. and by a UE
labor attorney. 8 The UE counsel opened this panel's testimony with a

81. Amended Notice of Hearing on Submissions #940001 and #940002, 59 Fed. Reg. 41,511
(1994).
82. See supra note 51.
83. See Procedural Guidelines, supra note 36, § H(7).
84. Transcript of Public Hearing from U.S. NAO at 4-8 (Sept. 12,1994) (on file with U.S.
NAO) [hereinafter Transcript]. NAO Secretary Irasema Garza presided over the hearing, accompanied
by staff members of the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs and
Solicitor's Office.
85. See Written Statement from Ron Carey and Amy Newell to the U.S. NAO (Sept. 12, 1994)
(on file with U.S. NAO).
86. Transcript, supra note 84, at 8-20.
87. Id. at 17.
88. See Written Statement from Fernando Castro, Ofelia Medrano, Benedicto Martinez & Robin
Alexander to the U.S. NAO (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
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summary of the factual background alleged in the submissions and introductions of the witnesses to follow. 89 Each of the workers gave accounts
of the termination of their own and co-workers' employment, allegedly
for their pro-union activities, recounting statements by company managers
that their union activity was the reason for their firing. 9°
The NAO hearing officer questioned these witnesses about their efforts
to seek redress under Mexican labor law procedures. One acknowledged
that while she first contested her dismissal and sought reinstatement
through the Mexican Junta de Conciiacidny Arbitraje (Conciliation and
Arbitration Board, CAB), she later, faced with an economic crisis, accepted severance pay and waived reinstatement rights. 9' Another worker
testified that his case was still pending before the CAB without a decision,
nearly ten months after his dismissal. 92
The F.A.T. union official described his work attempting to organize
at the Honeywell and General Electric plants. He alleged discrimination
by the Mexican government against his independent union federation,
contrasting it to the favorable treatment received by the governmentaffiliated C.T.M. federation. 93 He also alleged widespread use of blank
forms that workers are required to sign as a condition of employmerit
and that are later presented as signed resignation statements if workers
contest their dismissal, and widespread use of a blacklist by maquiladora
employers. 94 Questioning by the NAO hearing officer again went to
attempts by the witness to seek redress through the Mexican labor law
system, eliciting an explanation that government officials refused to entertain complaints from an independent union federation and that only
individual workers, not the union that is assisting them in organizing,
95
are permitted to seek legal remedies.
Panel 3 consisted of four Mexican labor attorneys with extensive experience representing workers and unions, much of it on behalf of
independent union groupings not connected to the dominant C.T.M.
federation.96 These attorneys went into greater detail on alleged discriminatory treatment of independent unions as a method of government
control of the labor movement, the use of pre-signed resignation forms
and blacklists, the application of severance pay and waiver of reinstatement
as a systematic method of suppressing union organizing, and restrictions
on the right to strike, alleging that such practices are especially prevalent
in the maquiladora sector. 97 Here the U.S. NAO engaged in the most

89. Transcript, supra note 84, at 20-27.
90. Id. at 27-39.
91. Id. at 38-39. The issue of severance pay and waiver of reinstatement as a systematic method
of stifling trade union organization became a focus of the hearing. See id. at 44-45, 72-74.
92. Id.at 33-34.
93. Id. at 39-49.
94. Id. at 46-50.
95. Id.at 49-51.
96. See Written Statements from Arturo Alcalde, Jesds Campos Linas, Jorge Fernidndez Sousa
& Gustavo de la Rosa to the U.S. NAO (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
97. Transcript, supra note 84, at 52-76.
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extensive questioning, with a wide-ranging interchange that covered the
substance of the law, the structure and practice of the CABs and other
administrative bodies, as well as the judicial system, and the application
of the cidusula de exclusidn or "closed shop" feature of Mexican labor
law.98
The final panel consisted of three United States labor attorneys connected with the Teamsters union, and a Canadian labor law expert. 99
The General Counsel of the IBT offered a series of "possible recommendations and agenda for consultation" for the NAO to pursue in its
public report. Among seven suggested recommendations was one that
would have the corporations reinstate dismissed employees, and one that
would have them adopt a "code of conduct" for their maquiladora
operations. Eight suggested agenda items for NAO-to-NAO or Ministerial
Consultations included holding conferences for employer and trade union
groups, and developing "plain language" guides to worker rights in the
three NAFTA parties.'0 A Teamster associate general counsel asked the
NAO to draw an adverse inference against the corporations in making
findings for its Public Report, based on their refusal to appear at the
hearing and subject themselves to questioning, as workers and union
representatives were willing to do.' 0'
The final witnesses encountered resistance from the NAO hearing officer
when they offered testimony comparing United States and Canadian labor
law regarding association and organizing rights. The third witness on this
panel, a Chicago-based Teamster attorney, fashioned an argument that
because workers' efforts at organizing were prompted by concerns over
health and safety issues, the cases should be permitted to advance to
ECE and dispute resolution phases rather than be blocked by an "arbitrary
separation between associational rights and health and safety issues."' 0 2
This witness also cited the recent Dunlop Report to show that problems
similar in some respects to those described at the hearing, such as
discrimination against union activists and delays in legal proceedings, also
exist in the United States. 03 The Canadian witness sought to describe
"positive" steps taken by the government of Ontario to protect rights
of association and organizing. He cited an Ontario law permitting immediate reinstatement of workers while their cases go forward, who are
allegedly dismissed for organizing.104 The relevancy of such comparative

98. See id.at 76-89. The "closed shop" is illegal under U.S. labor law. See National Labor
Relations Act, supra note 61, § 8(a)(3).

99. See Written Presentation by Judith A. Scott and Written Statement of Chris Schenk, Ontario
Federation of Labor, Possible Recommendations and Agenda for Consultation by the NAO (Sept.
12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO) [hereinafter Possible Recommendations]; Oral Statements of Earl
Brown, Jr. & Thomas Geoghegan, Transcript, supra noie 84, at 94-101.
100. See Possible Recommendations, supra note 99 (on file with U.S. NAO); Transcript, supra
note 84, at 90-94.

101. See Transcript at 94-95.
102. Id. at 100-01.
103. Id. at 95-98. See also U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Fact
Finding Report, Comm'n on the Future of Worker-Management Relations at 63-92 (May 1994).
104. See Transcript, supra note 84, at 105-06.
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information to a public report on the submissions was challenged by the
NAO hearing officer. 10 5
The hearing concluded with a brief exchange on the question of "what
provision or provisions in the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation ... authorized the NAO to make the recommendations you
suggest? ' ' 1° Counsel suggested that "your own rules envision recommendations," and pointed to the "range of consultations" in Article 22,
namely "any matter within the scope of the agreement."' 1 7 The Secretary
of the U.S. NAO closed the hearing with an announcement that persons
wishing to submit post-hearing briefs had one week to file.108
The two submitting unions and Honeywell each filed a post-hearing
brief or statement. 0 9 These were the only post-hearing filings. The UE
brief developed an argument that the use of severance pay as a method
of avoiding union organizing, even if technically legal under Mexican
law, is violative of ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association and
protection of the right to organize." 0 Among other points, the IBT argued
that comparative testimony on United States and Canadian experience is
relevant to the cases and that NAO resistance to the testimony was
"misplaced" because "a responsible request for Consultations ... should
evince a willingness to be self-critical" and that "knowledge of comparative methods of handling similar problems in the three Parties to
the NAALC . . . would help ensure that any subsequent Consultationswhich the NAO is empowered to request or recommend in connection
with these cases-could be carried out on the basis of cooperation and
equality.""' Honeywell pointed out that all controversies had been resolved and no matters involving it were pending before Mexican labor
2
law authorities."
V.

FIRST PUBLIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

On October 12, 1994, the U.S. NAO issued its public report on the
IBT and UE submissions." 3 The report first outlined the functions of
the NAO, then summarized the submissions of the two unions. It described
the conduct of the reviews, stressing that acceptance "was not intended

105. Id.at 110.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 111.
108. Id. at 112.
109. See Brief for the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) (Sept.
16, 1994) (Submission No. 940004) (on file with U.S. NAO) [hereinafter UE Brief]; Post-Hearing
Brief for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, (Sept. 19, 1994) (Submission No. 940002)
(on file with U.S. NAO) [hereinafter IBT Brief]; Letter from Honeywell to U.S. NAO (Sept. 19,
1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
110. LIE Brief at 2-3.
111. IBT Brief at 9-10.
112. Letter from Honeywell to U.S. NAO, supra note 109, at 1.
113. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #940001
and NAO Submission #940002 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Oct.
12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO) [hereinafter NAO Report].
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to indicate any determination as to the validity or accuracy of the
allegations contained in the submissions," and pointing out that the
reviews focused on "promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, labor laws that guarantee the right of association and the
right to organize freely and prohibit
the dismissal of workers because
11 4
of efforts to exercise those rights."
The report summarized or cited information received from submitting
unions and from the Honeywell and General Electric companies, from
the NAO of Mexico, from outside experts and from other sources. 5 It
devoted several pages to a description of the public hearing and the
statements of witnesses there," 6 and described the contents of post-hearing
statements by interested parties. 117
The report went on to review enforcement by the government of Mexico
of labor laws relevant to the submissions, again noting that "the issue
at hand in the review of the two submissions is whether the Government
of Mexico is enforcing its labor laws.1 1 18 It described the procedure and
functioning of the state and local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards
(CABs) that handled the Honeywell and General Electric matters, noting
that except for two cases still pending where a witness complained of
delays,1' 9 no allegations of improprieties on the part of CABs were
alleged. 120
In its key last section on findings and recommendations, the U.S. NAO
first repeated its admonition that its review "has not been aimed primarily
at determining whether or not the two companies named in the submissions
may have acted in violation of Mexican labor law," but rather "to gather
as much information as possible to allow the NAO to better understand
and publicly report on the Government of Mexico's promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, its labor law .... ,21 The
NAO noted that the review "reveals disagreements about the events at
each of the plants," namely whether workers were fired because of union
activity or not, without making any finding as to which version it
accepts. 22 However, the NAO did note that "the timing of the dismissals
appears to coincide with organizing drives by independent unions at both
plants." 2
In the next passage of the "findings and recommendations" section,
the NAO notes that:

114. See id. at 1-7.
115. Id. at 9-13, 22; see also supra notes 51, 55, 72, 73.
116. See NAO Report, -supra note 113, at 13-20. 117. Id. at 20-22; see also supra note 109.
118. See NAO Report at 21-28.
119. See Transcript, supra note 84, at 33-34.
120. See NAO Report at 26-28. There was testimony at the public hearing, however, alleging
that the Labor Secretary of the state of Chihuahua, who supervises the work of the CABs, expressed
prejudice against independent union organizing in the maquiladora when F.A.T. representatives
sought his assistance. See Transcript at 49-50, 78.
121. See NAO Report at 28.
122. Id. at 28-29.
123. Id. at 30.
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During the review,a number of other relevant issues regarding enforcement of labor law in Mexico, particularly in the maquiladora
sector, were brought to the attention of the NAO. They include the
difficulties in establishing unions in Mexico, the hurdles faced by
independent unions in attaining legal recognition, company black listing
of union activists, the use of blank sheets, and government preference
for and support of official unions.
Another such issue was the very high percentage of Mexican workers
dismissed from their jobs who elect to take severance pay rather than
124
seek reinstatement-which is their right under Mexican labor law.
However, the NAO declared itself to be "not in a position to make a
finding that the Government of Mexico failed to enforce the relevant
labor laws," noting that the dismissed workers' acceptance of severance
in legal proceedings, were
pay and the cases of two workers still pending
25
all in keeping with Mexican labor law.
The U.S. NAO recommended a series of cooperative programs regarding
rights of association and organizing, such as government-to-government
seminars, which would include state and provincial authorities, and "other
events that involve the business and labor communities in each of the
three countries."'' 26 It also recommended that each country educate its
public about the labor side agreement and its operation.
The NAO ended its report by stating that it "does not recommend
ministerial consultations on these matters under Article 22 of the NAALC."
It noted that "the information available to the NAO does not establish
that the Government of Mexico 27failed to promote compliance with or
'
enforce specific laws involved.' 1
VI.

CONCLUSION

Most press accounts portrayed the NAO Report as a victory for the
corporations and the Mexican government. "Reich Supports Mexico On
Union Organizing," said the headline in The New York Times. 28 The

Washington Post reported that "The Labor Department rejected complaints by two United States unions that Honeywell and General Electric
violated the rights of Mexican workers by firing them for being active
in union organizing campaigns.' '1 29 According to The Wall Street Journal,
"In its findings, the Labor Department said that the Mexican government
protected worker rights."' 3 0 Submitting unions reacted with anger to the
NAO's final report, terming the process that led to it a "grand fiasco"

124. Id. at 29.

125. Id. at 30-31.
126. See id. at 31.
127. Id. at 32.
128. Allen R. Myerson, Reich Supports Mexico On Union Organizing, N.Y. Tnas, Oct. 13, 1994,

at C7.
129. Financial

Digest,

WVAsH.

POST, Oct. 14, 1994, at C1,

C2.

130. See Asra Q. Nomani, Unions Angry After Administration Rejects Complaints About Mexico
Plants, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1994, at A2.
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and a "false promise," while Honeywell and General Electric officials
commended it.'
All these reactions-the press's "horse race" approach, the unions'
outrage and the companies' contentment-overlook important subtleties
in deciding the first cases brought under the NAFTA labor side accord.
First, the NAO did not reject the unions' complaints. It found "disagreement about the events,' 1 32 but noted pointedly that "the timing of
the dismissals appears to coincide with organizing drives,' 1 33 leaving an
implication that the workers might well have been fired for organizing.
Second, the NAO did not make a positive finding that the government
of Mexico protected worker rights. It couched its findings in the negative:
that it "is not in a position to make a finding that the Government of
Mexico failed to enforce the relevant labor laws,' ' 34 leaving open the
possibility that it did so fail.
Furthermore, the NAO report cited a number of "relevant issues ...
brought to the attention of the NAO" in the course of its review, without
characterizing them as being in dispute: difficulties in organizing, obstacles
to independent union formation, blacklisting, the use of blank resignation
forms, government favoritism toward official unions, and the high incidence of severance pay instead of reinstatement after dismissal. 135 Their
formulation as "relevant issues" rather than "allegations" leaves a clear
implication that these issues are substantive problems that need to be
addressed.
But discerning subtle implications in the NAO Report is no consolation
for the bottom line, as far as the unions are concerned. It did not
recommend Ministerial Consultations, the single follow-up measure clearly
36
available under the side accord and the NAO procedural guidelines.
Instead, it opted for "soft" recommendations such as seminars, confer137
ences and public information and education programs.
Conflicting versions of what actually happened in these first cases
created a dilemma for the U.S. NAO. On one hand, an NAO review
involves gathering information to prepare a report, not conducting a trial
to determine violations of the labor side agreement's terms. On the other
hand, the NAO's report must contain findings and recommendations. As
noted above, the NAO is hard pressed to make such findings or recommendations without implying that one or the other position of the parties
to these cases is to be credited.
The U.S. NAO tilted toward an expansive reading of the labor side
accord in accepting the first submissions and holding a public hearing.

131. Id.
132. NAO Report, supra note 113, at 28-29.
133. Id. at 30.
134. Id. at 30-31.
135. Id. at 29.
136. Recall that rights of association and organizing may only be a subject of NAO review and
Ministerial Consultation. They are not susceptible to an evaluation by an ECE or dispute settlement
by an Arbitral Panel. See supra note 25.

137. NAO Report, supra-note 113, at 31-32.
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It tilted back toward a narrow reading in deciding the cases when it
declined to offer findings on employer conduct and limited its inquiry
to "enforcement" matters, without going to "compliance," "ensuring"
high labor standards and "promoting" freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, which are also part of the labor side
accord.38 This bold-on-process, cautious-on-outcome approach is probably
as much as could be expected from a new government agency in its first
case.
The U.S. NAO acted in many respects like the ILO or the OECD
when they take up labor rights issues, where sanctions are lacking but
the existence of a forum for labor rights advocacy has an effect of its
own. 139 Precluded from sanctions by lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
the NAO still provided a forum where worker representatives could raise
and press for labor rights under terms of a trade agreement. Employers
and governments were forced to examine their own conduct and give an
accounting of events surrounding the alleged worker rights violations.
Naturally, the companies declared themselves innocent, and the government of Mexico gave the minimum permissible response under the
NAALC. But the dynamic launched by the NAO review process had its
own effect, independent of the possibility or impossibility of sanctions.
Behind the scenes, it forced the companies and the government to review
their own actions and to have subordinate officials explain their decisions
to superiors.' 40 On stage, they had to explain corporate conduct and
governmental administration, and to defend themselves in the court of
public opinion and political judgment, where the overall worth of NAFTA
and the side accords will ultimately be settled.
Union advocates suggested that the NAO decision gives U.S. companies41
and the Mexican government carte blanche to violate worker rights.'
This may be too dire a conclusion. Obviously, the decision let the
companies and the government off the hook to the extent that there
were no formal findings of unlawful conduct by employers or of failure
to enforce the law by the government, and no recommendation for
Ministerial Consultations. But easy access for trade union and worker
complainants to a public review and a public hearing on the types of
issues raised in the first NAO cases might, on the other hand, make
companies more careful in their employment policies where union organizing is underway, and make Mexican labor law authorities more evenhanded in their treatment of independent unions and more assertive on
behalf of workers discharged for organizing. Only future experience will
tell whether the unions' initial pessimistic view will be sustained.

2, 3(1), 22, 23(2), and annex 1. See also Procedural
138. See NAALC, supra note 1, arts. l(f),
Guidelines, supra note 36, § C(4).
139. See CAIPBELL & RowAN, supra note 9.
140. General Electric offered reinstatement to several of the dismissed employees in its Mexico
plant after an internal review undertaken in response to U.S. union complaints. NAO Report, supra
note 113, at 11-12, 27.
141. Bureau of National Affairs, NAO Closes Book on Union NAFTA Charges Against Honeywell
and General Electric, LAB. REL. WK. (BNA), Oct. 19, 1994, at 1009.
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This brings the analysis to a discussion of broader policy considerations
surrounding the NAO review process. Although the U.S. NAO disclaims
any overtly adjudicative function, it is difficult to see how it may avoid
such a role altogether. Any report must contain findings and recommendations. It is only natural that any findings and recommendations
will require judgments that at least imply compliance or noncompliance
with obligations under the labor side agreement.
The question left unanswered after the first cases is whether the NAO
will adhere to its narrow, enforcement-only approach in future cases or
take a more expansive approach. There is a fundamental problem that
the NAO has yet to address: what to do when apparent enforcement of
the law has the underlying effect of violating obligations assumed under
the labor principles of the NAALC labor rights. In these cases, for
example, the NAO declined to look underneath the surface of apparent
compliance with Mexican labor law where workers took severance pay
instead of seeking reinstatement. 142 While it mentioned them as "relevant
issues," the NAO also declined to address charges of legal technicalities
being strictly enforced against unions out of favor with the government
but loosely applied to government-connected unions, of supposed resignation statements actually deriving from pre-signed blank forms, of
blacklisting practices, and of anti-union discrimination by maquiladora

employers. 143
The NAALC permits the NAO to go beyond enforcement issues to
matters of ensuring high labor standards, promoting compliance with
labor law and promoting the labor principles of Annex 1.'44 The underlying
issue of whether a severance pay system where workers are forced by
economic necessity to accept pay and waive their reinstatement rights
operates defacto to deny them and their co-workers freedom of association
and protection of the right to organize could be addressed in a broader
approach to labor law matters, in keeping with the NAALC and the
NAO guidelines. Likewise, the NAO could more extensively address the
other "relevant issues" raised in this and future reviews. It remains to
be seen whether the NAO moves in this direction in future cases or
whether it instead stays on the track laid by this first, narrowly-drawn
decision.
From the standpoint of trade unions and labor rights advocates eager
to see aggressive enforcement of high labor standards, the NAO decision
is a disappointment. But labor rights in North America are not going
to rise or fall on the outcome of these initial NAO cases. After all, the
U.S. NAO cannot organize workers, negotiate collective bargaining agreements, win strikes or elect pro-labor candidates. Working people and
their allies have to do that. Meanwhile, the labor side accord and the

142. NAO Report, supra note 113, at 30-31.
143. See id. at 29.

144. See NAALC, supra note 1, arts. l(f), 2, 3(1), 22, 23(2), and annex 1. See also Procedural
Guidelines, supra note 36, § C(4).
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NAO review process provide a new forum where labor rights advocates
can press for improved working conditions
and call companies and gov45
ernments to account for their practices.1
From the standpoint of U.S. corporations with investments in Mexico,
and of the government of Mexico and other governments that might in
the future accede to NAFTA and the side accords and who want those
investments to expand, the first NAO decision should be viewed with
caution, not contentment. Whether GE and Honeywell were guilty or
innocent in these particular instances, the fact remains that labor practices
that have previously been in the private domain of employers and reviewed
by anonymous bureaucrats in obscure proceedings, are now subjected to
a formal, public governmental review with the trappings, if not the
substance, of an adjudicatory process.
Continued review of future submissions alleging corporate misconduct
and their public review, especially if the NAO expands its approach to
such cases, could cause companies involved in NAFTA trade to modify
labor relations policies with regard to union organizing, or at least soften
their treatment of individual workers involved in organizing. It could
also influence them to turn toward voluntary codes of conduct or some
other form of self-regulation as a counter to pressure or criticism from
trade unions or governmental bodies. More ominously for advocates of
increased North American trade, it could even cause them to begin to
weigh the benefits of NAFTA-related tariff reductions against the costs
of defending themselves in NAFTA's new labor rights regime. For example, corporations might look to China as a place to invest in the wake
of the Clinton Administration's decision to "de-link"
human and labor
146
rights considerations from China's trade status.
For the time being, the U.S. NAO is still defining its role and testing
its capacities. It could not reasonably be expected to take on the role
of an avenging angel in the first cases that came before it. For one
thing, the sheer complexity of Mexican labor law and its administration
makes definitive judgments difficult. It will take time to develop a
foundation of knowledge from which to base more ambitious findings
and recommendations.
At this point in the continuing strife over NAFTA and the labor side
agreement, hard-edged findings and aggressive recommendations against
the corporations or the government of Mexico might have the same
destructive impact on the new labor rights regime created by the side
accord that an initial refusal to accept the petitions for review, or a

145. The Telephone Workers Union of Mexico has filed a submission to the NAO of Mexico
alleging labor rights violations by the Sprint Corporation in connection with the shutdown of a
long-distance telephone operations center in California shortly before those workers were to vote
on union representation. See Tim Shorrock, Mexican Union Steps In To Defend U.S. Workers'
Rights, J. Com., Feb. 13, 1995, at A3.
146. See Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Is To Maintain Trade Privileges for China's Goods, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1994, at Al; Douglas Jehl, U.S. Is To Maintain Trade Privileges for China's
Goods, N.Y. TIsMS, May 27, 1994, at Al; Ann Devroy, Clinton Reverses Course on China; MFN
Action Separates Human Rights, Trade, WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at Al.
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refusal to hold a hearing, would likely have had among trade unionists
and their congressional allies. The business community and Mexican
government trade and labor policymakers could simply walk away from
it, characterizing an aggressive NAO as just a platform for companybashing and Mexico-bashing.
Just as importantly, the U.S. NAO has to find its place among other
U.S. federal agencies dealing with NAFTA issues, such as, for example,
other offices within the Labor Department's Bureau of International
Labor Affairs, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
State Department, the Commerce Department, the Agriculture Department, and the White House's foreign and trade policy apparatus. It will
take time to establish a substantial record of dealing with labor rights
cases and to build substantial credibility in order to have weight in
influencing future United States trade and labor rights policies.
The NAO's step forward in accepting these cases and holding a public
hearing, followed by its half-step back in declining to make findings of
guilt or moving toward Ministerial Consultation, may have been a sound
first course of action in a longer-range plan to develop its effectiveness.
From the complaining unions' point of view, they were victimized by
such a bureaucratic imperative. Similarly, the companies named in these
complaints are its beneficiaries. But in the long run, workers and trade
unions, as well as employers and governments, will be better served by
an NAO that has carefully built up its credibility and effectiveness in
the new international labor rights regime established by the NAALC.
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